Introduction
With the development of network, data collection and storage technology, the use and sharing of large amounts of data has become possible. Once the data and information accumulated , it will become the wealth of information. Data mining, otherwise known as knowledge discovery, can extracted "meaningful information" or "knowledge" from the large amounts of data, so supports people's decision-making (Han & Kamber, 2006) . However, traditional data mining techniques and algorithms directedly opreated on the original data set, which will cause the leakage of privacy data. At the same time, large amounts of data implicates the sensitive knowledge that their disclosure can not be ingored to the competitiveness of enterprise. These problems challenge the traditional data mining, so privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) has become one of the newest trends in privacy and security and data mining research. In privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), data mining algorithms are analyzed for the side-effects they incur in data privacy, and the main objective in privacy preserving data mining is to develop algorithms for modifying the original data in some way, so that the private data and private knowledge remain private even after the mining process (Verykios et al., 2004a) . A number of techniques such as Trust Third Party, Data perturbation technique, Secure Multiparty Computation and game theoretic approach, have been suggested in recent years in order to perform privacy preserving data mining. However, most of these privacy preserving data mining algorithms such as the Secure Multiparty Computation technique, were based on the assumption of a semi-honest environment, where the participating parties always follow the protocol and never try to collude. As mentioned in previous works on privacy-preserving distributed mining (Lindell & Pinkas, 2002) , it is rational for distributed data mining that the participants are assumed to be semi-honest, but the collusion of parties for gain additional benefits can not be avoided. So there has been a tendency for privacy preserving data mining to devise the collusion resistant protocols or algorithms, recent research have addressed this issue, and protocols or algorithms based on penalty function mechanism, the Secret Sharing Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold Cryptography are given (Kargupta et al.,2007 ; Jiang et al., 2008; Emekci et al., 2007) . This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related concepts of the PPDM problem. In Section 3, we describe some techniques for privacy preserving data mining In Section 4, we discuss the collussion behaviors in Privacy Preserving Data Mining. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions.
A preliminary list of evaluation parameters to be used for assessing the quality of privacy preserving data mining algorithms, is given below: (Verykios et al., 2004a) • the performance of theney, proposed algorithms in terms of time requirements, that is the time needed by each algorithm to hide a specified set of sensitive information; • the data utility after the application of the privacy preserving technique, which is equivalent with the minimization of the information loss or else the loss in the functionality of the data; • the level of uncertainty with which the sensitive information that have been hidden can still be predicted; • the resistance accomplished by the privacy algorithms, to different data mining techniques.
Privacy preserving data mining techniques
Data mining includes various algorithms such as classification, association rule mining, and clustering. In recent years, a number of techniques have been proposed to preserve privacy. Privacy preserving data mining techniques can be classified by different assumptions or domain knowledge.for example, data distribution, data modification, data mining algorithm, data or rule hiding, privacy preservation (Verykios et al., 2004a) . In this section, we will introduce some mainly privacy preserving data mining techniques, which include the Trust Party tehnique, randomization technique, Secure Multiparty Computation and anonymity techniques.
The trust party tehnique
The typical approach to data mining of distributed privacy preserving data is to build a data warehouse containing all the data, then mine the warehouse. This requires that the warehouse be trusted to maintain the privacy of all parties -since it knows the source of data, it learns site specific information as well as global results. For privacy preserving data mining, if we can find a fully trusted third party, then all parties give their input to the trust third party, and the trust third party computes the output and returns it to the parties. For example, current e-commerce transactions have a trusted (central) third party with access to all the information. The "trust" is governed by legal contracts enjoining the improper release of information. In some cases, the third party is dispensed with and contracts exist between the interested parties themselves. This is obviously insecure from the technical perspective. Trusted third parties are, however, difficult to find, especially when the number of participants increases. Though SMC enables this without the trusted third party, but the computation and/or communication required may be high. so the protocols obtained by this general construction are inefficient and useless in the case of a large number of participants.
Other factors, such as the need for continual online availability of the parties, create further restrictions and problems in realworld settings such as a web-based survey. So we need to extend the fully trusted party technique. For example, refernce (Gilburd et al., 2004) proposed a new privacy model: k-privacy --by means of an innovative, yet natural generalization of the accepted trusted third party model. This allows implementing cryptographically secure efficient primitives for real-world large scale distributed systems.
As an example for the usefulness of the proposed model, we employ k-privacy to introduce a technique for obtaining knowledge --by way of an association-rule mining algorithm from large-scale data basement, while ensuring that the privacy is cryptographically secure.
Data perturbation technique
Data perturbation technique, first proposed in (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000) , represents one common approach in privacy preserving data mining, where the original (private) dataset is perturbed and the result is released for data analysis. Data perturbation includes a wide variety of techniques including (but not limited to): additive, multiplicative (Kim & Winkler, 2003) , matrix multiplicative, k-anonymization (Sweeney, 2002) , micro-aggregation (Li & Sarkar, 2006) , categorical data perturbation (Verykios, 2004b) , data swapping (Fienberg & McIntyre, 2004) , resampling (Liew, 1985) , data shuffling (Muralidhar & Sarathy, 2006 ). Now we mostly focus on two types of data perturbation that apply to continuous data: additive and matrix multiplicative, other detailed data perturbation techniques can refer to the related literatures.
Additive perturbation
The additive perturbation is a technique for privacy-preserving data mining in which noise is added to the data in order to mask the attribute values of records (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000 . So the data owner replaces the original dataset X with ZXY = + . where Y is a noise matrix with each column generated independently from a n-dimensional random vector Y with mean vector zero. As is commonly done, we assume throughout that Y ∑ equals 2 I σ , i.e., the entries of Y were generated independently from some distribution with mean zero and variance 2 σ (typical choices for this distribution include Gaussian and uniform). In this case, Y is sometimes referred to as additive white noise. Thus, the original records cannot be recovered, but the distribution of the original records can be recovered.
Matrix multiplicative perturbation
The most common method of data perturbation is that of additive perturbations. However, matrix multiplicative perturbations can also be used to good effect for privacy-preserving data mining. The data owner replaces the original data X with YM X = where M is an nn ′ × matrix chosen to have certain useful properties. If M is orthogonal ( nn ′ = n and 
Evaluation of data perturbation technique
The data perturbation technique have the benefits of efficiency, and does not require knowledge of the distribution of other records in the data. This is not true of other methods such as k-anonymity which require the knowledge of other records in the data. this technique does not require the use of a trusted server containing all the original records in order to perform the anonymization process. While this is a strength of the data perturbation technique, it also leads to some weaknesses, since it treats all records equally irrespective of their local density. Therefore, outlier records are more susceptible to adversarial attacks as compared to records in more dense regions in the data. In order to guard against this, one may need to be needlessly more aggressive in adding noise to all the records in the data. This reduces the utility of the data for mining purposes. Reference (Liu et al., 2006) provides a detailed survey of attack techniques on the data perturbation, especially additive and matrix multiplicative perturbation. These attacks offer insights into vulnerabilities data perturbation techniques under certain circumstances. In summary, the following information could lead to disclosure of private information from the perturbed data. At the same time, a "privacy/accuracy" trade-off is faced for the data perturbation technique. On the one hand, perturbation must not allow the original data records to be adequately recovered. On the other, it must allow "patterns" in the original data to be mined. Data perturbation technique is needed for situations where accessing the original form of the data attributes is mandatory. It happens when, for instance, some conventional off-theshelf data analysis techniques are to be applied. While this approach is more generic, some inaccuracy in the analysis result is to be expected.
Application of the data perturbation technique
The randomization method has been extended to a variety of data mining problems. Refercence (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000) firstly discussed how to use the approach for solving the privacy preserving classification problem classification. Refercence (Zhang et al. 2005; Zhu & Liu, 2004) have also proposed a number of other techniques which seem to work well over a variety of different classifiers.
There has been research considering preserving privacy for other type of data mining. For instance, reference (Evfimievski et al., 2002) proposed a solution to the privacy preserving distributed association mining problem.The problem of association rules is especially challenging because of the discrete nature of the attributes corresponding to presence or absence of items. In order to deal with this issue, the randomization technique needs to be modified slightly. Instead of adding quantitative noise, random items are dropped or included with a certain probability. The perturbed transactions are then used for aggregate association rule mining. The randomization approach has also been extended to other applications, for example, SVD based collaborative filtering (Polat & Du, 2005) .
Secure multiparty computation technique 3.3.1 Background
In privacy preserving distributed data mining, two or more parties owning confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases without revealing any unnecessary information. For example, consider separate medical institutions that wish to conduct a joint research while preserving the privacy of their patients. One way to view this is to imagine a trusted third party--everyone gives their input to the trusted party, who performs the computation and sends the results to the participants. However, this is exactly what we don't want to do, for example, hospitals are not allowed to hand their raw data out, security agencies cannot afford the risk, and governments risk citizen outcry if they do. Thus, the question is how to compute the results without having a trusted party, and in a way that reveals nothing but the final results of the data mining computation. Secure Multiparty Computation enables this without the trusted third party. The concept of Secure Multiparty Computation was introduced in (Yao, 1986) and has been proved that there is a secure multi-party computation solution for any polynomial function (Goldreich,1998) . The basic idea of Secure Multiparty Computation is that a computation is secure if at the end of the computation, no party knows anything except its own input and the results. This approach was first introduced to the data mining community by Lindell and Pinkas (Lindell & Pinkas, 2002) , with a method that enabled two parties to build a decision tree without either party learning anything about the other party's data, except what might be revealed through the final decision tree. Now this technique have been developed for association rules, clustering, k-nearest neighbor classification, and are working on others. Allowed adversarial behavior: there are two main types of adversaries. (Lindell & Pinkas, 2002) a. Semi-honest adversaries: In semi-honest adversarial model, it correctly follows the protocol specification, yet attempts to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript of messages received during the execution. This is a ratherweak adversarial model. However, there are some settings where it can realistically modelthe threats to the system. Semi-honest adversaries are also called "honest-but-curious"and "passive". b. Malicious adversaries: In malicious adversarial model , a party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification .In general, providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries is preferred, as it ensures that no adversarial attack can succeed. Malicious adversaries are also called "active". We remark that although the semi-honest adversarial model is far weaker than the malicious model, it is often a realistic one. This is because deviating from a specified program which may be buried in a complex application is a non-trivial task.
Techniques for building secure multiparty computation protocols
In this section,we describe here some simple protocols that are often used as basic building blocks, or primitives, of secure computation protocols. Oblivious Transfer: Oblivious transfer is a simple functionality involving two parties. It is a basic building block of many cryptographic protocols for secure computation. The notion of 1-out-2 oblivious transfer was suggested by (Even et al., 1985) (as a variant of a different but equivalent type of oblivious transfer that has been suggested by (Rabin, 1981) ). The protocol involves two parties, the sender and the receiver. and its functionality is defined as follows:
• Input: The sender's input is a pair of strings 01 (,) xx and the receiver's input is a bit {0,1} σ ∈ .
• Output: The receiver's output is x σ (and nothing else), while the sender has no output.
In other words, 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer implements the function 01 (( , ), ) ( , ) xx x σ σ λ , where λ denotes the empty string (i.e., no output).
Oblivious transfer protocols have been designed based on virtually all known assumptions which are used to construct specific trapdoor functions (i.e. public key cryptosystems), and also based on generic assumptions such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. There are simple and eficient protocols for oblivious transfer which are secure only against semi-honest adversaries (Even et al., 1985) . Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation:The problem of "oblivious polynomial evaluation" (OPE) involves a sender and a receiver. The sender's input is a polynomial Q of degree k over some finite field F , namely a polynomial 0 ()
(the degree k of the polynomial, wis public). The receiver's input is an element . The protocol is such that the receiver obtains () Qz without learning anything else about the polynomial Q , and the sender learns nothing. That is, the problem considered is the private computation of the function (,) (,() ) Qz Qz λ .where λ is the empty output.
The major motivation for oblivious polynomial evaluation is the fact that the output of a k egree random polynomial is 1 k + wise independent; this is very useful in the construction of cryptographic protocols. Another motivation is that polynomials can be used for approximating functions that are defined over the Real numbers. Homomorphic Encryption:A homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme which allows certain algebraic operations to be carried out on the encrypted plaintext, by applying an eficient operation to the corresponding ciphertext. In particular, we will be interested in additively homomorphic encryption schemes (Paillier ,1999) that is comparable with the encryption process of RSA in terms of the computation cost, while the decryption process of the additive homomorphism is faster than the decryption process of RSA. (Paillier ,1999) .
Threshold decryption:
Threshold decryption is an example of a multiparty functionality. The setting includes m parties and an encryption scheme. It is required that any mm ′ < of the parties are able to decrypt messages, while any coalition of strictly less than m′ parties learns nothing about encrypted messages. This functionality can, of course, be implemented using generic constructions, but there are specific constructions implementing it for almost any encryption scheme, and these are far more eficient than applying the generic constructions to compute this function ality. Interestingly, threshold decryption of homomorphic encryption can be used as a primitive for constructing a very eficient generic protocol for secure multiparty computation, with a communication overhead of only () Om kc bits (Franklin & Haber (1996) for a construction secure against semi-honest adversaries, and Cramer et al. (2001) for a construction secure against malicious adversaries). Other Cryptographic Tools: Many basic security operations now have been applied to Secure protocols of privacy preserving data mining, such as Secure Sum, Secure Set, Secure Size of Set Intersection Union, Scalar Product (Clifton et al., 2002b) ..
Application of the secure multiparty computation technique
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) technique is a common approach for distributed privacy preserving data mining, and now has been extended to a variety of data mining problems. For example, Lindell & Pinkas (2002) introduced a secure multi-party computation technique for classification using the ID3 algorithm, over horizontally partitioned data. Specifically, they consider a scenario in which two parties owning confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases, without revealing any unnecessary information. Du & Zhan (2002) proposed a protocol for making the ID3 algorithm privacy-preserving over vertically partitioned data. Vaidya & Clifton (2002) presented the component scalar product protocol for privacy-preserving association rule mining over vertically partitioned data in the case of two parties; Wright & Yang (2004) applied homomorphic encryption to the Bayesian networks induction for the case of two parties. Zhan et al., (2007) proposed a cryptographic approach to tackle collaborative association rule mining among multiple parties.
Common errors of the secure multiparty computation
There are common errors which often occur when designing secure protocols, here we would like to use this section to introduce some of these errors briefly, interested reader can refer to (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009 ).
• Semi-honest Behavior does not Preclude Collusions: Assuming that adversaries are semi-honest does not ensure that no two parties collude. The "semi-honest adversary" assumption merely ensures that an adversary follows the protocol, and only tries to learn information from messages it received during protocol execution. It is still possible, however, that the adversary controls more than a single party and might use the information it learns from all the parties it controls. • Deterministic Encryption Reveals Information: A common misconception is that encrypting data, or hashing it, using any encryption system or hash function, keeps the data private. The root of the problem is the use of a deterministic function (be it a hash function or a deterministic encrypting scheme such as textbook RSA). One should therefore never apply a deterministic functio n t o a n i t e m a n d p u b l is h t h e r e s u l t .
Instead, a semantically secure encryption scheme must be used. Unfortunately, this rules out a number of "simple and eficient" protocols that appear in the literature (indeed, these protocols are not and cannot be proven secure).
• Input Dependent Flow: the flow of the protocol (namely, the decision which parts of it to execute), must not depend on the private input of the parties. Otherwise, The protocolis not secure • Security Proofs: It is tempting to prove security by stating what constitutes a "bad behavior" or an "illegitimate gain" by the adversary, and then proving that this behavior is impossible. Any other behavior or gain is considered benign and one need not bother with it. This approach is often easier than the use of simulation based proofs. However , it is hard to predict what type of corrupt behavior an adversary might take and thus dangerous to disregard any other behavior that we have not thought of as useless for the adversary. Indeed, real world attackers often act in ways which were not predicted by the designers of the system they attack. It is also hard to define what constitutes a legitimate gain by the adversary, and allow it while preventing illegitimate or harmful gains. The notion of "harmful" might depend on a specific application or a specific scenario, and even then it might be very hard to define. So the protocol designers must prove security according to the simulation based proof (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009 ), which prevent any attack which is not possible in an idealized scenario.
Evaluation of the secure multiparty computation technique
Secure Multiparty Computation enables distributed privacy preserving data mining without the trusted third party, Moreover, the secure multiparty computation technique make the result of data mining correct without information loss. The shortcoming of the technique is the computation and communication overhead of protocol is very high, esperically for the large database, which hinder its application in practice. So secure multiparty computation, due to its high computational requirement, is most suitable for situations where the number of distributed sources is relatively small and the global analysis to be supported can be derived by the given set of primitives.
A game theoretic approach to privacy preserving data mining
Game theory has been widely applied in many different domains like economics, finance, etc. Recently, it has also been applied for managing distributed computing environment. Applications of game theory in secure multi-party computation and privacy preserving distributed data mining is relatively new. Kleinberg et al. (1998) proposed a microeconomic view of data mining and illustrated how data clustering for customer segmentation in a market with two players could be modeled as a two-player game so that the segmentation was driven by the objective of deriving best marketing strategies. Kleinberg et al., (2001) tried to justify the fairness of disclosing private information as part of a transaction by the compensation of gaining better services using a game theoretic approach, for applications like marketing survey and collaborative filtering. In addition, there are some recent studies based on game theory to address the collusion problem of privacy preserving data mining that use secure multiparty computation (Abraham et al., 2006; Kargupta et al., 2007) . Kargupta et al.(2007) offers a game-theoretic framework for the PPDM problem as a multiparty game where each party tries to maximize its own objectives, and also presents equilibrium-analysis of such PPDM-games and outlines a game-theoretic solution based on the concept of "cheap-talk" borrowed from the economics and the game theory literature.
The collussion behaviors in privacy preserving data mining
Based on cryptographic techniques and secure multi-party computations, privacy preserving protocols or algorithms have been designed for Privacy preserving data mining . However, many of these algorithms make strong assumptions about the behavior of the participating entities, such as, they assume that the parties are semi-honest, that is, they always follow the protocol and never not try to collude or sabotage the process.
As mentioned in previous works on privacy-preserving distributed mining (Lindell & Pinkas, 2002) , the participants are assumed to be semi-honest that is rational for distributed data mining, but these kind of assumptions fall apart in real life and the collusion of parties happen easily to gain additional benefits. For example (Kargupta et al., 2007) , the US Department of Homeland Security funded PURSUIT project involves privacy preserving distributed data integration and analysis of network traffic data from different organizations. However, network traffic is usually privacy sensitive and no organization would be willing to share their network traffic with a third party. PPDM offers one possible solution which would allow comparing and matching multi-party network traffic for detecting common attacks, stealth attacks and computing various statistics for a group of organizations without necessarily sharing the raw data. However, participating organization in a consortium like PURSUIT may not all be ideal. Some may decide to behave like a "leach" exploiting the benefit of the system without contributing much. Some may intentionally try to sabotage the multi-party computation. Some may try to collude with other parties for exposing the private data of a party.
The collussion analysis of PPDM based on the game theory
A p p l i c a t i o n s o f g a m e t h e o r y i n s e c u r e m u lti-party computation and privacy preserving distributed data mining is relatively new (Abraham et al., 2006 ; Kargupta et al., 2007) . Kargupta et al. (2007) argues that large-scale multi-party PPDM can be thought of as a game where each participant tries to maximize its benefit by optimally choosing the strategies during the entire PPDM process. With a game theoretic framework for analyzing the rational behavior of each party, authors present detailed equilibrium analysis of the well known secure sum computation (Clifton et al., 2002b) as an example. A new version of the secure sum is proposed as follows and interested readers can find a detailed anysis in Kargupta et al. (2007) . Secure Sum Computation (Clifton et al., 2002b) : Suppose there are n individual nodes organized in a ring topology, each with a value ,1 , 2 , ,
It is known that the sum , where i z is the perturbed version of local value i v to be sent to the next node i + 1. Node n performs the same step and sends the result n z to node 1. Then node 1, which knows R, can subtract R from n z to obtain the actual sum. This sum is further broadcasted to all other sites. Collusion Analysis (Kargupta et al., 2007) : it can be shown that any i z has an uniform distribution over the interval [0, 
where W is a constant and is known to all the colluding nodes. Now, it is clear that the colluding nodes will know i v is not greater than W, which is some extra information contributing to the utility of the collusions. To take a further look, the colluding nodes can compute the posteriori probability of i v and further use that to launch a maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimate-based attack. It can be shown that, this posteriori probability is: Due to space constraints, we have not included the proof of this result here. Game Analysis (Kargupta et al., 2007) : In a multi-party PPDM environment, each node has certain responsibilities in terms of performing their part of the computations, communicating correct values to other nodes and protecting the privacy of the data. Depending on the characteristics of these nodes and their objectives, they either perform their duties or not, sometimes, they even collude with others to modify the protocol and reveal others' private information. Let i M denote the overall sequence of computations node i has performed, which may or may not be the same as what it is supposed to do defined by the PPDM protocol. Similarly, let i R be the messages node i has received, and i S he messages it has sent. Let i G be a subgroup of the nodes that would collude with node i. The strategy of each node in the multi-party PPDM game prescribes the actions for such computations, communications, and collusions with other nodes, i.e., (,, ,) cRcScG . Then the overall utility of node i will be a linear or nonlinear function of utilities obtained by the choice of strategies in the respective dimensions of computation, communication and collusion. Without loss of generality, we consider an utility function which is a weighted linear combination of all of the above dimensions:
,, represent the weights for the corresponding utilityfactors. Note that we omitted other nodes' strategies in the above expression just for simplicity. In secure sum computation, the derived posteriori probability can be used to quantify the utility of collusion, e.g.,
We see here that this utility depends on i Wv − and the size of the colluding group k. Now we can put together the overall utility function for the game of multi-party secure sum computation:
,, , , where the utilities due to communication and computation are constant and hence can be neglected for determining the nature of the function. Through studying the plot of the overall utility of multi-party secure sum as a function of the distribution of the random variable i Wv − and the size of the colluding group k, it shows that the utility is maximum for a value of k that is greater than 1. Since the strategies opted by the nodes are dominant, the optimal solution corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. This implies that in a realistic scenario for multi-party secure sum computation, nodes will have a tendency to collude. Therefore the non-collusion (k = 1) assumption of the classical secure multi-party sum is sub-optimal. From the above analysis we can see, the collusion of parties happen easily to gain additional benefits in multi-party privacy preserving data mining, because the strategies of following protocol is not always optimal. Based on the penalty mechanism without having to detect collusion, a cheap-talk protocol is proposed to offer a more robust process,and the optimal strategy is to following the protocol for secure computation with punishment strategy. In a word, the semi-honest adversarial model is often a realistic one (Lindell & Pinkas ,2002) , but it sometimes deviate from the real-life application of privacy preserving distributed data www.intechopen.com mining, so it will a new trend for privacy preserving data mining is to make the collusion resistant protocols or algorithms algorithm work well in real life. Recent research have addressed this issue, and collusion resistant protocols or algorithms based on penalty function mechanism, the Secret Sharing Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold Cryptography are given.
Collusion resistant protocols based on penalty function mechanism
For distributed privacy preserving data mining, to achieve a Nash equilibrium with no collusions, the game players can adopt a punishment strategy to threaten potential deviators. Kargupta et al., (2007) design a mechanism to penalize colluding nodes in various ways: 1. Policy I: Remove the node from the application environment because of protocol violation. Although it may work in some cases, the penalty may be too harsh since usually the goal is to have everyone participate in the process and faithfully contribute to the data mining process. The new secure sum with penalty (SSP) protocol is as follows (Kargupta et al., 2007) : Consider a network of n nodes where a node can either be good (honest) or bad (colluding). Before the secure sum protocol starts, the good nodes set their estimate of bad nodes in the network 0 k′ = and bad nodes send invitations for collusions randomly to nodes in the network. Every time a good node receives such an invitation, it increments its estimate of k′ . Bad nodes respond to such collusion invitations and form collusions. If a bad node does not receive any response, it behaves as a good node. To penalize nodes that collude, good nodes split their local data into k α ′ random shares. This initial phase of communication is cheap talk in our algorithm. The secure sum phase consists of () Ok α ′ rounds of communication for every complete sum computation. This process converges to the correct sum in () On k α time. Note that, the SSP protocol does not require detecting all the colluding parties. Raising k′ based on a perception of collusion will do. If the threat is real, the parties are expected to behave as long they are acting rationally to optimize their utility.
Collusion resistant protocols based on the secret sharing technique
Now, we are particularly interested in the mining of association rule in a scenario where the data is vertically distributed among different parties. To mine the association rule, these parties need to collaborate with each other so that they can jointly mine the data and produce results that interest all of them. And we will provide a secure, efficient and collusion resistant distributed association rules mining algorithm based on the Shamir's secret sharing technique (Shamir,1979) .
Shamir's secret sharing technique
Shamir's secret sharing method (Shamir,1979) The n parties want to conduct association rule mining on 12 n DB DB DB DB = ∪∪ ∪ and find the association rule with support and confidence being greater than the given thresholds. During the mining of association rule, we assume all parties follow the protocol, and the object of the paper is to propose a protocol of distributed association rules mining in vertically partitioned data based on the Shamir's secret sharing technique (Shamir,1979) , which can prevent effectively the collusion behaviors and conduct the computations across the parties without compromising their data privacy, simultaneously, the security of the protocol refer to semantic security (Goldreich, 2001 ).
Distributed association rule mining algorithm
In order to learn association rule, one must compute confidence and support of a given candidate itemset, and given the values of the attributes are 1 or 0, to judge whether a particular itemset is frequent, we only need to find out the number of records (denote c.count) where the values for all the attributes in the itemset are 1. if c.count Ns% ≥ ，then the candidate itemset is the frequent itemset. The following is the algorithm to find frequent itemsets: which is discussed in (Agrawal & Srikant, 1994) . Given the counts and frequent itemsets, we can compute all association rules with support minsup ≥ .
In the procedure of association rule mining, step 1, 3, 6 and 8 require sharing information. In step 3 and 8, we use merely attribute names, in step 1, to compute large 1-itemsets, each party elects her own attributes that contribute to large 1 _ itemsets , where only one attribute forms a large 1-itemset, there is no computation involving attributes of other parties, therefore, data disclosure across parties is not necessary. At the same time, since the final result kk LL = ∪ is known to all parties, step 1, 3 and 8 reveal no extra information to either party. However, to compute c.count in step 6, a computation accessing attributes belonging to different parties is necessary. How to conduct these computations across parties without compromising each party's data privacy is the challenge we are faced with. If the attributes belong to different parties, they then construct vectors for themselves attributes, for example, for the some candidate itemset, party i P have p attributes 12 ,,, p aa a , then party i P can construct vector i A , the jth element denote
A . Subsequently, they can apply our secure algorithm to obtain c.count, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.4
Privacy-preserving algorithm to collaboratively compute c.count
The fact that the distributed parties jointly compute c.count without revealing their raw data to each other presents a great challenge. In this section, we show how to privately compute c.count based on Shamir's secret sharing algorithm (Shamir, 1979) for the case of multiple parties without revealing the secret values to others. Without loss of generality, assuming party 1 P has a private vector 1 A , party 2 P , a private vector 2 A ,…, and party n P , a private vector n A , we use i j A to denote the jth element in vector i A , the value of i j A is the attribute value of the i P in the jth transaction of the database. Given that the absence or presence of an attribute is represented as 0 or 1, the value of i j A is equal to 0 or 1, for example (1, 0, 1 ,1 0)
Assuming all parties follow the algorithm and do the computations honestly, the whole process is summarized in Algorithm 3. 12: Solve the set of equations to find the sum 
Analysis of the privacy-preserving algorithm to obtain c.count
In this section, we give the correctness, complexity and security analysis of the privacypreserving algorithm 3. Correctness Analysis:Assuming party i P has a private vector i A , so for arbitrary transaction j in database DB , party i P has a private value i j A , according algorithm 3, the sum 
Sx q x q x q x =++ + , so we need to solve the following liner equations: Compared to the other technique, for example, commutative encryption and secure multiparty computations, although these techniques are very secure, the excessive computation and communication cost associated render them impractical for scenarios involving a large number of parties. However the algorithm proposed by our paper is scalable in terms of computation and communication cost, and therefore it can be run even when there is a large number of parties involved. So our algorithm is efficient and practical. Security Analysis: Proposition 1: Algorithm 3 is semantic security (Goldreich, 2001) 
Collusion resistant protocols based on the homomorphic threshold cryptography
Now we have known homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption often are used as basic building blocks of secure computation protocols for PPDM. In this section , we will study the privacy preserving distributed association rule mine problem( §4.3.2) base on homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption, where homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption can refer to §3.3.3. In order to learn association rule, we should find frequent itemsets, Algorithm 2 give how to find frequent itemsets, where the key step is step 6 (compute c.count) . How to conduct these computations across parties without compromising each party's data privacy is the challenge we are faced with. If the attributes belong to different parties, they then construct vectors for themselves attributes, for example, for the some candidate itemset, party i P have p attributes 12 ,,, p aa a , then party i P can construct vector i A , the jth element denote
A . Subsequently, they can also apply our secure algorithm to obtain c.count, which will be discussed in Section 4.4.1.
4.4.1Collusion resistant protocol based on the homomorphic threshold cryptography
The fact that the collaborative parties jointly compute c.count without revealing their raw data to each other presents a great challenge. In this section, we develop secure protocol to compute c.count for the case of multiple parties. α −+ , where α is the number of bits for each encrypted element. It consist of (1) the maximum cost of (1 ) nN − from step 1(b); (2) the maximum cost of (1 ) nN − from step 1(f)-1(i); (3) the maximum cost of 2n from step 2(c) and 2(d).
The following contributes to the computational cost: (1) the generation of a threshold cryptographic key pair, the integer X and nN random integers (2) the total number of nN n + encryptions; (3) the total number of (1 ) ( 1 ) nN −+ multiplications; (4) the generation of permutation function; (5) the total number of N permutations; (6) the total number of (1 ) nN + decryptions; (7) the total number of N modulo operations; (8) the total number of (1 ) nN + additions; (9) dividing N numbers into n parts. Security Analysis:Given that n P obtains all the encrypted terms from other parties and the cryptographic system is a semantic security, the ciphertext does not leak any useful information about the plaintext and n P can not get other useful information of the plaintext from the ciphertext. Meanwhile, since the cryptographic system is a threshold cryptosystem, those parties will not able to decrypt and get the plaintext unless they cooperate. That is, n P will not have access to the original values of other parties without cooperating with those parties. As a result, the collusion behaviors can be prevented effectively. 12 ,, n PP P in our protocol jointly generate a threshold cryptographic key pair 12 (( , , , ) , ) n dd d d e of a homomorphic encryption scheme, which means the protocol is secure under the condition of the number of the collusion parties is less than n. Generally, given 12 ,, Since i D are in permuted form and those n-1 parties don't know the permutation function, so they cannot know which transaction support the association rule. And each party only knows a part of transactions supporting the association rules, which lead to trivial benefit for them.
Conclusion
Due to the right to privacy in the information ear, privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) has become one of the newest trends in privacy and security and data mining research. In this chapter, we intrduced the related concepts of privacy-preserving data mining and some privacy preserving techniques such as Trust Third Party , Data perturbation technique, Secure Multiparty Computation and game theoretic approach. Moreover, we discussed the collussion behaviors in privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) and gave the collusion resistant protocols or algorithms based on penalty function mechanism, the Secret Sharing Technique, and the Homomorphic Threshold Cryptography.
